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ABSTRACT 
Adding security functions in existing Web application servers is 
now vital for the IS of companies and organizations. Writing 
crosscutting functions in complex software should take advantage 
of the modularity offered by new software development 
approaches. With Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP), 
separating concerns when designing an application fosters reuse, 
parameterization and maintenance. In this paper, we design a 
security aspect called AProSec for detecting SQL injection and 
Cross Scripting Site (XSS) that are common attacks in web 
servers. We experiment this aspect with the AspectJ language and 
the JBoss AOP framework. With this experimentation, we show 
the advantage of runtime platforms such as JBoss AOP for 
changing security policies at runtime. Finally, we describe related 
work on security and AOP. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Companies and organizations use Web servers to publish 
information that concerns directly their users. However, other 
institutions consult their operations through these same servers. 
The ignorance of the developers concerning the vulnerabilities of 
this kind of systems, highlights the weakness of these software. 
OWASP's Top Ten listing references two common attacks on this 
type of systems: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection 
[1]. SQL injection is a technique where a would-be intruder 
modifies an existing SQL request to post hidden data, to crush 
important values, or to process dangerous orders for the database. 
That is made when the application retrieves data sent by the 
Internet users, and uses it directly to build a SQL request. Cross 
Site Scripting (XSS) is an attack exploiting a weakness of a Web 
site that fails to validate the parameters entered by the users. XSS 
uses various techniques for injecting (and executing), scripts 
written in languages such as JavaScript or VBScript. The goal of 
these attacks is to keep cookies containing information identifying 
users, or to mislead them later so that they provide these data to 
the attacker.   
Security techniques used by most web developers do not perform 
very well. The approach Design for security defends the idea that 
security should be taken into account during all the phases of the 
development cycle and must influence deeply the design of the 
application.  
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is a good candidate for this 
feature [2]. AOP has been proposed as a technique for improving 
separation of concerns in software systems and for adding 
crosscutting functionalities without changing the business part of 
the software. AOP provides specific language mechanisms that 
make possible to address concerns, such as security, in a modular 
way. AOP languages and tools can be applied at compile-time or 
at run-time. This way, the security issue in a software system can 
be addressed  
Our main objective is to design and implement a security aspect 
called AProSec to deal with SQL Injection and XSS web attacks. 
Our proposal is based on the aspect programming models offered 
by AspectJ and JBoss AOP and defines the elements necessary for 
the defense of a Web site against these attacks, not only by 
validating and filtering the user info, but also by implementing a 
SQL analyzer that can intercept and validate all the database 
queries before they are processed. These elements will appear as 
AspectJ [3] aspects woven at compile-time and, in a second 
version, at run-time with the JBoss AOP [4] framework. 
Our work is motivated by the need to fill the gap between an 
integrated version of a web server with security functions and a 
modular version with AOP techniques. This paper leads to the 
definition of a model for addressing security issues in software 
applications that could be re-used on several software systems 
with few changes and be dynamically added at the runtime. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the motivation and principles of SQL Injection, XSS and AOP. 
Section 3 provides the Web application architecture. Section 4 
defines our AProSec Aspect, its integration with the web server 
architecture and details the difference between two weaving with 
AspectJ and JBoss AOP. Section 5 describes some related work. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses some future work.  
2. MOTIVATION AND PRINCIPLES 
2.1 SQL  injection and XSS  
SQL injection 
According to [1] a SQL injection attack consists in finding a 
parameter that a web application sends to a database. The attacker 
embeds malicious SQL commands into parameters in order to 
trick the web application for forwarding a malicious query to the 
database. As a result of this kind of attack, the database contents 
can be corrupted, destroyed or disclosed. 
Many techniques are used in SQL injection. The most popular are 
tautology, union, additional declaration and comments. In order to 
explain each technique, we will consider the case in which a web 
application authenticates a user by executing the following query: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='alice' and 
password = 'toto' 
Tautology looks for a disjunction in the WHERE clause of a 
select or update statement. In the previous example it can be made 
by adding the statement 'a'='a', resulting in the following query: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='alice' and 
password = 'toto' or 'a' = 'a' 
The precedence operator causes the WHERE clause to be true for 
every row, and all table rows will be returned. 
The union clause allows grouping the result of two SQL queries.  
The goal is to manipulate a SQL statement into returning rows 
from another table. As an example we will assume that a database 
containing the reports is available: 
SELECT body, results FROM reports 
When using this statement with our example, we will obtain the 
following query: 
SELECT body, results FROM reports 
UNION 
SELECT * FROM users  
As result the query will display the reports list, but also the 
database users in the application. 
The additional statements technique attempts to add SQL 
statements or commands to a SQL query. For example: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='alice' and 
password = 'toto' 
DELETE FROM users WHERE username = 'admin'. 
When executing the previous query, the admin record would be 
erased from the database. 
We can also use comments. Most of the databases use the “--“ or 
“#” characters for a comment indication. An attack can use the 
comments to cut a SQL query and change the meaning of it. For 
example the following SQL statement: 
SELECT * FORM users WHERE name = 'alice' and 
password = 'toto' can be transformed in the following way: 
SELECT * FORM users WHERE name = 'admin' -- and 
password = '' 
The result will show all the information about the admin user in 
the user’s database. All these attacks can be combined to form 
more complex SQL queries.  
XSS 
The XSS cross site scripting is an attack oriented to the user’s 
browser, in order to disclose the end user’s token, to attack the 
local machine, or to spoof content to fool the user [1]. The 
attacker uses a web application to send malicious code generally 
in the form of a script to a particular user. The attack takes 
advantage of web applications that do not validate the output 
generated by a user’s input. The attack is known as XSS attack, 
and not CSS attack, to avoid confusion with Cascading Style 
Sheets.  
As an example, consider a web application that gives the visiting 
user the opportunity to send a comment through a guest book.  A 
malicious user can introduce the following characters “<! --“. 
After some time, these characters are mixed with other users' 
input, resulting in the following content in the guess book: 
Very good web page, dude! 
<!-- 
You’re da man, boss 
When a user reads the guest book with a browser, it will read all 
the contents and will interpret the character “<!--“ not as a user’s 
opinion, but as a HMTL tag. As a result, the rest of the content in 
the guest book is ignored by the users' browsers. We can imagine 
the effects of the following statements in the guest book. 
<script> 
  for (q=0; q < 1000; q++) 
 window.open(http://www.hot.example); 
</script> 
This is an example of a very simple XSS attack. An attacker can 
introduce scripts that can take session cookies of a user and send 
them to the attacker. With this information the attacker can use 
the system as the original user. 
2.2 AOP 
The domain of aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [2][3] 
appeared in 1996. It was pioneered by Gregor Kiczales and his 
team, then at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center. While original 
and innovative, the domain of AOP inherits results from other 
programming approaches such as reflection, open 
implementations, meta-object protocols or generative 
programming. 
One of the experiences that motivated the definition of AOP was 
the study of the Tomcat servlet engine. When studying the code 
of Tomcat, Gregor Kiczales and his team discovered that, while 
some functionality was cleanly modularized in classes, other, 
such as user session management or logging, appeared in several 
classes. This phenomenon is known as code scattering. When 
developers want to fix a bug or to upgrade such functionalities, 
they have to scan and modify several source files. While feasible, 
this hinders productivity and is error-prone. In other cases, the 
code scattered around several classes, was also redundant. The 
consequence of this scattering is that a given method mixes 
concerns related to different functionalities. This second 
phenomenon is known as code tangling. Once again this hinders 
the maintainability and understandability of applications. 
When faced with these two phenomena, the question is whether 
scattering and tangling are irreducible or is the result of a poor 
design. In other words, could Tomcat be re-designed to prevent 
scattering and tangling? While open, the answer to this question is 
usually no. The idea is that a complex piece of software such as 
Tomcat may be decomposed according to many criteria: the 
decomposition may be data-driven, process-driven, driven by 
various requirements such as security, integration with existing 
information systems, or performance. It happens that one is 
chosen by designers and that the other decompositions may not fit 
in the scheme introduced by the first one, leading to 
functionalities being scattered and tangled. The purpose of AOP is 
then to provide a solution to solve these issues. 
AOP, as a new programming paradigm, introduces notions such 
as an aspect, a join point, a pointcut and an advice code. 
However, these notions do not replace existing ones such as a 
class, an object, a procedure or a method. Rather, AOP must be 
seen as a complement to these existing techniques. Furthermore, 
these notions are not specific to a programming style (e.g. object-
oriented or procedural) or a given syntax (Java, C#, Ada, 
COBOL, etc.). Aspect-oriented extensions exist for many 
languages, object-oriented or procedural. Furthermore, aspects 
can be applied (the term used by the AOP community is woven) 
at compile-time or at run-time. Experience has shown the 
difficulty of writing crosscutting functions such as security [5]. 
3. Web application architecture 
 
Figure 1: The architecture of our Web application server 
Figure 1 shows the architecture of our Web Application Server 
(WAS). The client sends a request to the Web Application Server. 
This HTTP request is intercepted and validated by the AProSec 
aspect. If needed, the WAS sends a request to the Database in 
order to get a response for the client. This latter JDBC request is 
also intercepted and validated by the AProSec aspect. If the 
request is correct, it will be processed, otherwise it is rejected. 
4. The AProSec Aspect 
The AProSec aspect can be used by any AOP framework and is 
composed of three parts. First, an advice  (the added code) defines 
the validation process. Second, the way AProSec validates the 
requests depends on the options that the administrator selects on 
the configuration file, as shown in Section 4.2. Finally, the 
pointcut part (where the code is added) allows the weaving with 
the WAS. How this weaving is made will be described in Section 
4.3 and 4.4 for each implementation.  
4.1 Advice 
The advice part consists in two main validations:  
1. HTTP requests parameters  (intercepting javax.servlet.http. 
HttpServletRequest.getParameter(String) call), 
2. DB queries (intercepting java.sql.Statement.addBatch(String), 
execute(String), executeQuery(String) and executeUpdate (String) 
calls). 
When implementing these validations, we consider several 
syntaxes that should be validated: double and single quotes, SQL 
Injection, and XSS. In the HTTP requests, we validate the 
parameter value to avoid code injection and invalid HTML tags. 
For DB queries, the validation is made by analyzing the query 
string to prevent “always true” comparisons and comments. 
When validating the HTTP requests, we prevent SQL Injection by 
removing any single or double quotes sent by the user. As a 
result, using the same example as before, for the user validation: 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='alice' and 
password = 'toto' or 'a' = 'a' 
The attacker should have input alice as the user and toto' or 
'a' = 'a as the password. AProSec would validate this and 
change the password to toto\' or \'a\' = \'a taking the 
whole string as the password and not as two operations. 
SELECT * FROM users WHERE user='alice' and 
password = 'toto\' or \'a\' = \'a' 
As for the XSS, all the tags the user may input are transformed to 
HTML code preventing the attacker from introducing any tags. If 
the administrator wants to allow an HTML tag from the user, 
these tags are transformed to safe tags (explained in Section 4.2). 
Using the XSS example, in the input: 
<script> 
  for (q=0; q < 1000; q++) 
 window.open(http://www.hot.example); 
</script> 
The <script> tag would be transformed into &lt;script&gt; 
allowing the browser to print it as text an not interpret it as a 
script. This includes other validations explained in this section. 
4.2 The SQL Analyzer 
Once the input got through the filter, if it is going to be used for a 
database query, it will be validated again in the context of the 
query. This helps to prevent unsafe queries to the database in case 
any malicious input got through the previous filters.  
In order to validate JDBC requests, AProSec checks that the 
queries don't contain any comments or “always true” comparisons 
by not allowing queries like: 
'value' = 'value' 
'value' != 'value2' 
table1.field1 = table1.field1 
login = 'admin' -- ' and password = '' 
 
Doing this, the SQL Analyzer enforces the application's security 
by not allowing unwanted code to be sent to the database and 
executed. 
4.3 Configuration of the AProSec aspect 
Even though single and double quotes are part of the SQL 
injection, the AProSec aspect manages them separately. We 
define all the validations that can be done, but the administrators 
can decide which ones to use by using the configuration file. 
The configuration file is in XML format and is described in 
Figure 2. 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
<!DOCTYPE validator [ 
<!ELEMENT validator 
(validateQuotes,validateApost,validateSQLInj,valid
ateXSS,validTag*)> 
 <!ELEMENT validateQuotes (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT validateApost (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT validateBackslash (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT validateSQLInj (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT validateXSS (#PCDATA)> 
 <!ELEMENT validTag (#PCDATA)> 
]> 
Figure 2: The configuration file 
In order to define the validations to make, we define a set of 
ELEMENT with the following meaning: 
validator: This is the root element. 
validateQuotes: To validate double quotes (“) from a 
parameter. If this option is enabled, every time the applications 
receives a form or URL parameter, it will convert the double 
quote (“) to “backslash double quote” (\”). 
validateApost: To validate single quotes (') from a 
parameter. If this option is enabled, every time the application 
receives a form or URL parameter, it will convert the single quote 
(') to “backslash single quote” (\'). 
validateBackslash: To validate backslash (\) from a 
parameter. If this option is enabled, every time the application 
receives a form or URL parameter, it will convert the backslash 
(\) to “double backslash” (\\). 
validateSQLInj: To activate the SQL Analyzer and validate 
database queries with certain rules. If this option is enabled, every 
time the application issues a database call, the query is validated 
to prevent unexpected queries to execute. 
validateXSS: To validate user input for XSS attacks. If this 
option is enabled, every time the application receives a form or 
URL parameter, this parameter is validated and all the HTML 
tags are transformed into safe tags. 
validTag: To accept certain HTML tags. If this option is 
enabled and the validateXSS option is enabled too, then for 
every tag found in the parameter, this validation checks if it 
should accept the tag and transform it to a safe tag. This tag must 
be used for every HTML tag the administrator wants to accept. 
A safe tag is the one that will not be printed as an HTML tag. For 
example, if a parameter contains the tag “<a href='#'> LINK 
</a>”, the filter will transform it into “&lt;a href='#'&gt; 
LINK&lt;/a&gt”, allowing the tag to be safely displayed. To 
enable an option, the value “TRUE” (case insensitive) should be 
used as the tag value. Any other value will disable the option. If 
an element is not present, then the default values are taken. The 
default values are all TRUE, without accepting any HTML tags.  
Valid tags cannot contain an on* family element; if it does, it will 
be removed. If we are accepting the <a> tag, the input: This is 
<a href=”#” onClick=”alert('Thank you!');”>a 
link</a>. Will be transformed as: This is <a href=”#”>a 
link</a>. Also, no parameter value can contain the words 
“javascript”, “vbscript” nor “tcl”, to prevent attacks 
like <img src="javascript:alert('Oops!');”>.  
4.4 Weaving with AspectJ  
AspectJ [3] is the most widely used language for aspect-oriented 
programming. It defines an extension of the Java programming 
language for dealing with aspects. The AspectJ compiler handles 
Java source code or bytecode, weaves them with aspects, and 
generates some bytecode that can then be executed with a 
standard Java virtual machine. 
Our first approach is made using AspectJ as the AOP framework, 
Tomcat as the application server and MySQL as the database 
manager. The code for intercepting the calls in AspectJ is 
described in Figure 3. 
pointcut dbWrite(String query): (call(* 
java.sql.Statement.addBatch(String)) 
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.execute(String)) 
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.executeQuery 
(String)) 
  || call(* java.sql.Statement.executeUpdate 
(String)))  
  && args(query); 
pointcut getParameter(): call(String 
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest.getParameter
(String)); 
Object around(String query): dbWrite(query){ 
  Object ret = validator.Validator().validateQuery 
(proceed()); 
  return ret; 
} 
String around(): getParameter(){ 
  return new validator.Validator().validate 
(proceed()); 
} 
Figure 3: The intercepting code with AspectJ 
In AspectJ the aspect is defined using the extended java language 
in a .aj file. By using the new expressions of the language we 
declare our pointcuts specifying the calls to be intercepted. With 
our pointcuts defined, we then call the validator to verify that the 
parameter or query is not dangerous. 
4.5 Weaving with JBoss AOP  
JBoss AOP [4] is a framework for programming aspect-oriented 
applications in Java. It can be used as a standalone framework or 
embedded in the JBoss J2EE server. Web applications running on 
this server can then take advantage of the aspect-oriented features 
of the framework. JBoss AOP is an open-source project that can 
be downloaded from http://www.jboss.org/products/aop 
By using JBoss AOP, a vulnerable application can now be 
protected at compile time or at runtime by applying the security 
aspects. Both modes were tested. The main advantage of the load 
time (or runtime) mode is that the application doesn't need any 
manipulation before getting it in the WAS. Using the compile 
time mode, we need to recompile the source files and then 
package them before getting them to run in the WAS. 
The JBoss code for intercepting the calls is described in Figure 4. 
<aop> 
  <bind pointcut="call(java.lang.String 
$instanceof{javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest}
->getParameter*(java.lang.String))"> 
    <interceptor 
class="interceptors.HTTPInterceptor"/> 
  </bind> 
  <bind pointcut="call(* 
$instanceof{java.sql.Statement}-> addBatch* 
(java.lang.String))"> 
    <interceptor class= 
"interceptors.QueryInterceptorQuery"/> 
  </bind> 
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> execute* 
(java.lang.String))"> 
    <interceptor 
class="interceptors.QueryInterceptor"/> 
  </bind> 
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> executeQuery* 
(java.lang.String))"> 
    <interceptor class= 
"interceptors.QueryInterceptor"/> 
  </bind> 
  <bind pointcut="call(* $instanceof 
{java.sql.Statement}-> executeUpdate* 
(java.lang.String))"> 
    <interceptor class= 
"interceptors.QueryInterceptor" /> 
  </bind> 
</aop> 
Figure 4: The intercepting code with JBoss AOP 
When using JBoss AOP we define our aspect using a XML file. 
Here we specify the call we want to intercept and the class we 
want to call when intercepted. This class will then call the 
validator to verify the parameters and queries. 
4.6 Experimentation results 
We developed a vulnerable online bookstore, to test the AProSec 
aspect. First we tried all sorts of SQL Injection and XSS attacks to 
see how the application behaved. Then we protected it with 
AProSec using two approaches: AspectJ and JBoss AOP. After 
using AProSec we attacked the application again, but were unable 
to bypass the application's security. 
For example, let assume than an attacker tries to input the 
following query in order to obtain information as a system 
administrator: 
     select * from users where login=’admin’ - - and 
‘pwd=’ ‘; 
The query will not be processed by the database because it 
contains a commentary inside it. The SQL analyzer will detect it 
and will refuse to pass it to the database manager. 
In another example the attacker will try to obtain information 
using a query that contains a statement that is always true. 
    select * from users where login='admin' and 
pwd='' or 1=1; 
The analyzer will detect that there is a statement that always is 
true and will refuse to process it.  
Both frameworks, AsoectJ and JBoss AOP, will help to reach our 
goal, but since we prefer to keep the aspect working without the 
need of the source code, the runtime weaving sounds as a better 
option. This way, even if we don't have access to the source code 
we can still improve our applications' security. 
5. RELATED WORK 
Security approaches for SQL injection and 
XSS 
The best way to be protected against SQL attacks is to inspect all 
the data the user introduces to the application. Most of the work in 
this area attempts to limit the way in which a pre-programmed 
query will be used, allowing only the sentence that the 
programmer wants to define. 
In [6] the authors propose to use a parsing tree that represents the 
parsed SQL query. Once the user introduces the required data, a 
new parsing tree is generated and compared with the first one. An 
SQL injection attack will produce a different tree.  
The AMNESIA project [7] defines a model for detection of illegal 
SQL queries, before they are executed by the DBMS. In the first 
phase, the source code is analyzed in order to generate the model 
that contains the valid SQL queries. In a second phase, a real time 
monitor compares the SQL generated by the program with those 
stored in the model. 
SQL DOM technique, described in [8], is a set of classes that are 
strongly-typed to a database schema. Instead of string 
manipulation, these classes generate SQL statements. The 
solution is based on an executable called sqldomgen, which 
generates a dynamic link library (DLL) based on the structure of 
the database. The DDL contains classes that will be used to 
construct dynamic SQL statements without manipulating any 
strings. 
In [9] the authors propose a randomization of the instruction set. 
They create an execution environment that is unique to the 
running process. In order to achieve this, the original opcodes of 
the computer server are transformed by a random key. If an 
attacker tries to inject code and it does not know the key, the 
machine will not execute this code, causing a runtime exception.  
Another solution is the use of application IDS (Instruction 
Detection System). This kind of IDS is oriented to supervise 
specific applications, including SQL applications. The authors in 
[10] propose to use a Network IDS in order to look for invalid 
SQL statements in the network traffic. 
The advantage of AProSec, in comparison with the other works, is 
that it is based on AOP and it considers both, SQL Injection and 
XSS in the same aspect. Also, when using JBoss AOP it provides 
runtime weaving, allowing the administrator to incorporate 
AProSec without recompiling the application. Once the 
application is running with AProSec, any change in the 
configuration file will be taken during runtime, without stopping 
the application at any moment. 
5.1 AOP and Security 
The domains of aspects and security have already been the subject 
of several works. Among the security related functionalities that 
have been the topic of an aspect-oriented development, one can 
find: access control [15] [16] [17], encryption [12] [14], the 
adding of digital signatures [13], authorization [14] and 
authentication [14]. Most of the implementations described in 
these studies, such as [13] [14] [16], rely on AspectJ.  
The work presented at [18] is closest to the objectives of our 
project. The authors propose an aspect to detect cross-site 
scripting. Their approach relies on sanitizing, i.e. replacing 
special characters by quoted ones, the input data submitted by 
users to web applications. The authors take the case of servlet-
based web applications. When data is submitted to a servlet, one 
of the issues which are raised consists in determining whether it 
comes from an end-user or whether it comes from another servlet 
which delegates the request by mean of the transfer mechanism 
provided by the servlet container. In the latter case, data is 
supposed to be trustworthy as it simply originates from another 
part of the application. In this case, the sanitizing can be skipped 
in order to save computation time. To achieve this, the authors 
propose to extend the syntax of the AspectJ pointcut language 
with a new construct to detect data flows: the servlet input is 
sanitized if and only if it is written back on the servlet output 
stream. As far as we know, this data flow operator remains at the 
level of a proposal and has not been implemented. Furthermore, it 
remains to be seen in what circumstances this solution is more 
efficient than a solution that would sanitize all input streams 
regardless of their origin. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have presented our approach for writing a security aspect in a 
web application server. This aspect detects SQL injection and 
XSS attacks in requests. As an advantage to usual solutions, this 
aspect allows the interception of all database accesses and 
validates them with its SQL Analyzer before dangerous 
information is stored. Moreover, the AProSec aspect can be 
parameterized. The administrator doesn't need to recompile the 
code and can freely decide which validations to apply to each web 
application. We have described our two experimentations, one 
with AspectJ and another with JBoss AOP.  
With our approach, an aspect allows a clear separation of the 
security code and the WAS code. The initial code of the WAS 
was not modified. By this way the aspect will be able to evolve 
independently. We only have to program it once for all web 
applications. 
For further study, a first approach would be to add path traversal 
attack detection. The path traversal of a file is an attack in which, 
through request, the user provides information concerning the 
access path of a file (e.g., "../../target_dir/target_file").  This kind 
of attack tries to access files that shouldn’t be accessible. These 
attacks can be sent in the form of a URL or of an entry such that it 
can have access to a given file. Second, cryptography issues can 
be added to applications in order to protect the disclosure of data 
for unauthorized parts. AOP will also take care of the key 
encryption management, and the encryption/decryption processes. 
This will be transparent for the users and their e-mails will be 
safe. Authentication can be added to, in order to accept any kind 
of known applications, token, or biometric. Finally, we plan to 
design and develop a more expressive pointcut language for 
security by the definition of an Aspect Specific Language (ASL).  
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